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ABSTRACT 
Insider-outsider theory is often used as a basis for explaining the hysteretic behaviour of 
unemployment. Despite this, there is no empirical evidence about the validity of this theory on 
explaining the persistence of unemployment. This paper addresses this gap, using various labour 
market proxies of insiders’ power for the OECD countries over 1960-2013 and employing panel 
unit root tests that exploit the information contained in these proxies. The results show that 
although the unemployment rate exhibits a pronounced hysteretic behaviour in OECD countries, 
this behaviour is reversed once we account for the insider-outsider proxies. Our findings thus 
validate the role of the insider-outsider theory as a key source of unemployment hysteresis. 
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1. Introduction 
An extensive strand of the literature tests the hysteresis in unemployment, a hypothesis which 
implies that any deviations of unemployment from its natural rate will be permanent, as suggested 
by Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1987). The empirical literature, however, provides mixed 
evidence. Whilst some studies have documented evidence of hysteresis, e.g. Mitchell (1993), Røed 
(1996) and Bakas and Papapetrou (2014), others, such as Jaeger and Parkinson (1994), Arestis and 
Mariscal (1999) and Camarero and Tamarit (2004), provide evidence against. Noticeably, these 
studies examine the hysteresis hypothesis using alternative unit root testing techniques and/or 
different samples and pay no attention to investigate the sources of this phenomenon, which is 
important to set policies that address the persistence of unemployment. 
The hysteresis hypothesis of unemployment (Blanchard and Summers, 1986; 1987) implies that 
movements in unemployment are characterized by persistence and, thus, temporary shocks to the 
economy have permanent effects and move the actual level of unemployment away from its 
equilibrium level. This hypothesis can be translated as the presence of a unit root in the 
unemployment rate. The rejection of the hysteresis hypothesis implies that unemployment 
fluctuates around the natural rate, which in turn means that the unemployment rate follows a mean-
reverting process, and the shocks to the economy have only temporary effects. In this way, the 
evidence of level stationarity for the unemployment rate would be in support of the natural rate for 
unemployment (Friedman, 1968 and Phelps, 1968).1  
The insider-outsider theory has long been used to explain the hysteresis hypothesis of 
unemployment (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). According to this theory, as advocated first by 
                                                          
1 See Cross (1988), Røed (1997) and O’Shaughnessy (2011) for an overview of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the hysteresis in unemployment. 
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Blanchard and Summers (1986), hysteresis in unemployment arises from the power of insiders in 
the wage determination mechanism. Currently employed workers – the insiders – are able to secure 
wage increases for themselves – above the level of their reservation wage –, since their position is 
protected by labour turnover costs (such as the costs of hiring, firing and providing firm-specific 
training) that firms face and, thereby, prevent the unemployed – the outsiders – from competing 
wages down and force firms to reduce employment. As a result of this mechanism, Blanchard and 
Summers (1986) and Gottfries and Horn (1987) show that a negative shock in the economy will 
lead to layoffs of insiders by firms and, thus, to the subsequent rise of job security for the remaining 
of insiders. The outcome of higher job security is a rise of the insider wage for those remain in the 
firms, and thereby, the reduction of total labour demand in the economy, which results to 
unemployment persistence (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). Insiders’ power, hence, reflects labour 
market rigidities and turnover costs which may affect the level and presistence of unemployment.2  
A series of studies have explored the relation between rigidities in labour market institutions and 
the rate of unemployment and find that institutional rigidities play a vital role on explaining 
unemployment patterns and persistence (see for example Belot and Van Ours, 2001; 2004 and 
Nickell, 2003). When labour market institutions turn to be more rigid, wages will start to increase. 
If this push in wages is not compatible with productivity, employment will tend to fall until the 
point that the higher unemployment in the economy will lead to a downward pressure on the wages 
that will offset the initial effect of the higher labour market rigidity. Thus, this mechanism can 
explain the impact of institutional rigidity on the natural rate of unemployment (Saint-Paul, 2004). 
However, most OECD countries have experienced changes in labour market rigidities over the last 
decades. For example, many European countries have faced a sharp increase in unemployment 
                                                          
2 See Lindbeck and Snower (2001, 2002) for surveys on the literature of the insider-outsider theory. 
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benefits after the 1960s, while the employment protection legislation index has increased for most 
of the countries over this period (Nickell, 2003). Furthermore, there is significant heterogeneity of 
labour market rigidities across the OECD countries (Saint-Paul, 2004). An important dimension 
of this environment is the power of the insiders which can determine labour market rigidities in 
the economy (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988 and Berthold and Fehn, 1996).  
Despite the widespread use of the insider-outsider theory as the key source of unemployment 
hysteresis, little is known about its validity empirically, and this is where our main contribution 
lies. In this way, this paper analyse the nexus between insiders’ power, as a proxy of labour market 
rigidities, and unemployment persistence. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that 
evaluates whether the insider-outsider theory, proxied by the measures of trade union density, 
coordination of wage-setting and level of wage-bargaining, can explain the persistence of 
unemployment rate in a sample of OECD countries over the period 1960-2013. These measures 
can be considered as prominent proxies for the power of insiders.3 
We, first, use conventional panel unit root tests to examine the behaviour of unemployment rate. 
Then, our empirical framework extends the panel unit root tests to allow for the presence of 
covariates in the testing equation of the hysteresis hypothesis for unemployment, see Pesaran et 
al. (2013). By doing so, we take into account the information that is contained in our insider-
outsider covariates, and thus conduct a direct test for the insider-outsider theory. Our results show, 
first, that using conventional panel unit root tests we find evidence of hysteresis in unemployment 
for the OECD countries. However, this result is completely reversed, and the unit root in 
unemployment rate is strongly rejected, once we employ the panel unit root tests allowing for the 
                                                          
3 See Section 2 for more details on the insider-outsider proxies.  
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insider-outsider covariates. This supports the insider-outsider theory as a key source of the 
hysteretic behaviour of unemployment and confirms the theoretical foundations of Blanchard and 
Summers (1986, 1987) and Lindbeck and Snower (1988). 
In terms of policy, our findings suggest that labour market policies, which increase the power of 
insiders, like job security regulations and restrained labour market flexibility, can prevent the 
ability of a country to revert the effects of temporary shocks on unemployment. Consequently, 
reforms in the direction of lessening the insiders’ power through limiting the role of trade union, 
reforming job security regulations, and/or reducing the wage-bargaining level, can lead to lower 
unemployment persistence. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 provides the 
empirical methodology. Section 4 presents our empirical results, while Section 5 provides further 
results and robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Data 
We use an unbalanced annual dataset of 21 OECD countries from 1960 to 2013.4, 5 This is the 
longest period for which the data for the labour market measures; trade union density, coordination 
of wage-setting and the level of wage-bargaining, are available. The source of unemployment rate 
                                                          
4 The 21 OECD countries in our sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
5 Our unbalanced panel includes 21 OECD countries for which time series data for the unemployment rate 
and covariates are available in good quality over the total observation period (1960 to 2013). However, in 
the robustness section, we complement our empirical analysis using a sample of 17 OECD countries where 
we drop 4 countries (Greece, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain) as their data for the covariates are available 
for shorter period. Thus, we have a balanced panel of 17 OECD countries that allows us to apply both the 
CIPSM and CSBM tests of Pesaran et al. (2013) as the latter requires a balanced panel. 
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(Un. Rate) and trade union density (Union) is the OECD labour force statistics whilst the source 
of the coordination of wage-setting (Coord) and the level of wage-bargaining (Wbl) is the ICTWSS 
Database Version 5.1. In addition, we have created the variable Power that consists the first 
principal component of the three labour market institution covariates (Union, Coord and Wbl). 
This aggregate measure encapsulates the insiders’ power of the three proxies.  
Trade union density is the trade union membership as a percentage of wage and salary earners in 
employment. Trade union activity, which only represents the insiders’ interests, is considered as 
the most obvious source of insiders’ power (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988; Layard and Bean, 1989; 
Emmenegger, 2009 and Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2013). Moreover, we use two proxies of 
wage-bargaining level. The coordination of wage-setting is a discrete measure, ranging from 5 to 
1, reflecting the degree of coordination from economy-wide bargaining to fragmented bargaining, 
confined largely to firm-level. Additionally, the level of wage-bargaining is a discrete measure 
that represents the predominant level at which wage bargaining takes place, ranging from 5 
(national or central level) to 1 (local or company bargaining level), see van Ours (2015). The high 
wage-bargaining power of insiders increases the equilibrium rate of unemployment via boosting 
labour market rigidities (Berthold and Fehn, 1996; Saint-Paul, 2004 and Heidenreich, 2015). 
Furthermore, bargaining power is positively associated with turnover costs thereby it strengthens 
the position of insiders relative to outsiders, which enhances the wage pressure and unemployment 
rate (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988; Berthold and Fehn, 1996; Emmenegger, 2009 and Holmlund, 
2014). There are various other potential measures of labour market frictions, such as minimum 
wages, unemployment insurance, unemployment benefits, employment protection legislation and 
severance pay (see Holmlund, 2014), however, data availability for these factors is limited. These 
6 
proxies can also influence unemployment persistence through different mechanisms.6 The main 
objective of this paper is to test the role of the insider-outsider theory as a source of hysteresis, 
however, we explore also whether alternative measures of labour market frictions can explain 
unemployment persistence.7 Finally, our proxies capture the insiders’ power but can also reflect 
these additional factors, e.g. trade unions minimize labour turnover cost by pushing for more job 
security regulations (Emmenegger, 2009).  
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the unemployment rate for the 21 OECD countries against the 
OECD average for the period 1960-2013. The figure shows the substantial heterogeneity of OECD 
labour markets. Saint-Paul (2004) illustrates that the observed divergence in unemployment rates 
across Europe is a real difference in labour markets rather than a statistical artifact since this 
divergence cannot be explained by obvious measurement issues such as different definitions of 
unemployment across countries. 
– Figure 1 here – 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the unemployment rate and the covariates for our panel. A 
high variation in all variables is evident, for example Union ranges from 7.5% to 84%. 
Furthermore, the average of both Coord and Wbl indicates that the wage-bargaining level, and thus 
the insiders’ power, is relatively high in our sample.  
– Table 1 here –  
                                                          
6 See Section 5 for more details on these additional labour market proxies.  
7 We complement our main empirical analysis using these additional measures in the robustness section of 
the paper. We would like to thank two anonymous referees for drawing our attention to this point. 
7 
Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients between the covariates and the unemployment rate. The 
high correlation between Coord and Wbl is anticipated since both covariates reflect the wage-
bargaining level. The positive correlation between Union and wage-bargaining level proxies 
(Coord and Wbl) indicates that all three covariates operate in an analogous manner, i.e., they reflect 
the power of insiders relative to outsiders.  
– Table 2 here –  
 
3. Empirical methodology 
To test for the hysteresis hypothesis (i.e., the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root) in the 
dynamics of the unemployment rate in our sample, we rely on panel augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) unit root tests. Specifically, we use the MW test of Maddala and Wu (1999), the CH test of 
Choi (2001), the IPS test of Im et al. (2003) and the CIPS test of Pesaran (2007), which accounts 
for cross-sectional dependence across the countries. 
3.1.   Panel unit root tests with covariates 
In the case where the null hypothesis of hysteresis in unemployment is not rejected using the 
standard tests (MW, CH, IPS and CIPS), we proceed and explore the insider-outsider theory as 
source of the hysteretic behaviour of unemployment, by employing panel unit root tests that allow 
for the presence of various labour market proxies as covariates in the panel regression. To do so, 
we use the CIPSM panel unit root test proposed by Pesaran et al. (2013), which incorporates 
additional covariates in the augmented Dickey-Fuller panel regression and accounts for a 
multifactor error structure. Therefore, this test can exploit the information contained in a number 
of additional covariates (the insider-outsider proxies in our case) that are assumed to share the 
common factors with the unemployment rate. Following Pesaran et al. (2013), we augment the 
8 
ADF panel regression with the cross-section averages of the lagged levels and first-differences of 
the unemployment rate and the additional covariates. In particular, we employ the following ADF 
panel regression: 
Δ𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖𝑈𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑𝑗=1
𝑝 𝛿𝑖𝑗Δ𝑈𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 
+ 𝑐𝑖?̅?𝑡−1 + ∑
𝑝
𝑗=0 𝑑𝑖𝑗Δ?̅?𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖?̅?𝑡−1 + ∑
𝑝
𝑗=0 𝑓𝑖𝑗Δ?̅?𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑖,𝑡 ,                        (1) 
where 𝑈𝑖,𝑡 is the unemployment rate for for country i at time t, ?̅?𝑡 and ?̅?𝑡 are the cross section 
averages of the unemployment rate and the measures of insiders’ power respectively, with ?̅?𝑡−1 =
𝑁−1 ∑𝑁𝑗=1 𝑈𝑗,𝑡−1 and ?̅?𝑡−1 = 𝑁
−1 ∑𝑁𝑗=1 𝑍𝑗,𝑡−1.
8 Therefore, as suggested by Pesaran et al. (2013), 
the CIPSM test is based on the average of the individual cross-sectionally augmented ADF t-ratios 
for 𝜙?̂? (𝑡𝜙𝑖), given as 𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑀 = 𝑁
−1 ∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑡𝜙𝑖(𝑁, 𝑇). 
Simulated critical values of the test are listed in Pesaran et al. (2013). The test rejects the null 
hypothesis of hysteresis in unemployment (i.e., the unit root null hypothesis) when the value of 
the statistic is less than the respective critical value. According to Pesaran et al. (2013), the CIPSM 
test do not show any size distortions for combinations of N and T. 
Our testing framework, thus, uses an augmented Dickey-Fuller panel regression with the inclusion 
of alternative measures of labour market (and possible combinations of them) as additional 
covariates to testing for unit root in the unemployment rate.9 In this way, a rejection of the null 
                                                          
8 By utilising this ADF panel regression specification, where the covariates are included in Equation (1) in 
the form of lagged levels and first-differences of the cross-section averages (?̅?𝑡−1 and Δ?̅?𝑡−𝑗), the covariate 
panel unit root test of Pesaran et al. (2013) is unaffected by any potential endogeneity of the covariates. 
9 As we have explained previously, this test exploits the information contained in a number of covariates 
that share the common factors with unemployment. Thus, as each covariate depends on the common factors, 
the test is robust to the endogeneity of the observable factors toward the common factors that determines 
the unemployment rate. 
9 
hypothesis of the presence of a unit root in unemployment rate will lead to the conclusion that 
hysteresis in unemployment is absorbed by the labour market covariates, and thereby can be 
explained by the insider-outsider theory. Therefore, the information contained in the proxies of the 
insider-outsider theory affects the power of the unit root test, indicating that the unemployment 
rate in OECD countries does not display hysteretic behaviour. 
To supplement the above ADF panel unit root testing framework, we employ a three-step testing 
strategy, which utilizes a semi-parametric fractional integration approach, to check for the 
presence of a unit root in unemployment rate (see among others, Shimotsu and Phillips, 2005; 
Kumar and Okimoto, 2007; Shimotsu, 2010; Christopoulos and McAdam, 2017). This approach 
is independent from the hypothesis that the labour market covariates are endogenous or exogenous, 
while it has also been demonstrated that the performance of these semi-parametric fractional 
integration estimators is unaffected by the endogeneity of the covariates as additional regressors 
(Velasco, 2006; Shimotsu, 2012; Christopoulos and McAdam, 2017).10 A detailed description of 
this test is presented in the online appendix. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results for our unbalanced sample of 21 OECD countries based on the 
alternative panel unit root tests for the unemployment rate without and with covariates, both in the 
case of an intercept and that of an intercept and a linear trend.11 Specifically, Table 3 displays the 
results of the tests without the covariates: the MW, CH, IPS tests and the CIPS test that accounts 
also for cross-sectional correlation. All tests, clearly, do not allow us to reject the null of a unit 
                                                          
10 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this issue. 
11 Following Pesaran et al. (2013), we use the lag augmentation order for the panel tests according to p = 
[4(T/100)1/4]. 
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root in the unemployment rate at the 5% level of significance, indicating that unemployment 
exhibits pronounced hysteretic behaviour for the panel of OECD countries. 12  These results 
reaffirm the previous findings for the OECD economies (for example, Mitchell, 1993 and Røed, 
1996) and imply that the impact of a temporary shock on unemployment last longer and will lead 
to a permanent rise in the level of unemployment (Lindbeck and Snower, 2002).  
– Table 3 here – 
Table 4 presents the results of the covariate CIPSM panel unit root test of Pesaran et al. (2013), 
that allow us to control for the addition of the insider-outsider covariates (Union, Coord and Wbl). 
To explore the robustness of the test to the choice of the additional covariates used in the ADF 
panel augmentation in Equation (1), we report the results of the CIPSM test using all possible 
combinations of these covariates, as well as using their first principal component (Power). In 
contrast to the previous outcome of the tests without covariates, the evidence based on the CIPSM 
covariate panel unit root test shows that the null hypothesis of a unit root in the panel is strongly 
rejected at the 5% (in 10 out of 16 cases) or 10% significance level (in 3 cases) for all possible 
covariates and for most of the alternative combinations of them. The only exceptions are in the 
case of using Coord as the additional covariate where the CIPSM test does not reject the null in 
the version with trend and the cases where the two covariates (Coord and Wbl) and the three 
covariates (Union, Coord and Wbl) are used in the version with trend, where the null cannot be 
                                                          
12 This evidence is also confirmed by the individual ADF unit root tests for each country. These results 
show that for all 21 OECD countries we cannot reject the null of a unit root (with the exception of the 
version with trend where the results hold for the vast majority of the countries, i.e., 20 out of 21 countries). 
This is a strong evidence of hysteresis for the OECD sample. These results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
11 
rejected at the conventional levels of significance.13 
– Table 4 here – 
These results suggest that while we find a strong evidence of hysteretic behaviour of 
unemployment for the OECD countries when we use the panel tests without covariates, this result 
is completely reversed when we use the tests that allow for the insider-outsider covariates. The 
inclusion of the proxies makes the unemployment rate stationary, leading to the conclusion that 
the hysteretic behaviour of unemployment can be explained by the insider-outsider theory. 
Insiders’ power, thus, determines the level of unemployment persistence through labour market 
rigidities and turnover costs (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). Therefore, a transitory shock to the 
economy will lead to the reduction of the number of insiders by firms and the subsequent rise of 
wages by the remaining insiders (as a result of their higher job security) as well as the discourage 
of future employment (Lindbeck and Snower, 2002). Labour market rigidities, and in particular 
high turnover costs associated with insiders’ power, inhibit the ability of the economy to absorb 
the shocks in unemployment in OECD countries.  
 
5. Further results and robustness 
In order to check whether our results are sensitive to the potential endogeneity of the labour market 
covariates we implement a three-step testing strategy that uses a semi-parametric fractional unit 
root approach based on Shimotsu and Phillips (2005), Shimotsu (2010) and Christopoulos and 
McAdam (2017). To do so, we estimate the long memory parameter (d) using the semi-parametric 
                                                          
13 Our results are robust to alternative sets of OECD countries. In the robustness section we have employed 
the tests to a sub-sample of 17 OECD countries. The results are consistent with those from the sample of 
the 21 OECD countries. In addition, we have explored the set of the 15 OECD countries used in Mitchell 
(1993) and Song and Wu (1998) with qualitatively similar findings. These results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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two-step ELW estimator for the unemployment rate and the residuals from the models with the 
labour market covariates. Consistent with our previous results, the fractional unit root tests (Table 
5) show that the unemployment rate has a unit root as the estimated long memory parameter 
exceeds unity (?̂?𝑈 > 1). When we estimate the d parameter for the residuals, based on the models 
with the insider-outsider covariates, we can observe that the null hypothesis of a unit root is 
rejected for all measures, ?̂?𝑒 < 1. Additionally, we can observe that the covariate long memory 
parameters, in all cases, are well below of that from the unconditional parameter, ?̂?𝑒 < ?̂?𝑈, which 
is a clear indication that the insider-outsider covariates stabilize unemployment, and, thus, 
signaling that hysteresis in unemployment in OECD countries can be elucidated by these labour 
market covariates. 
– Table 5 here – 
Our main objective is to test the role of the insider-outsider theory as a cause of hysteresis, 
however, it is interesting to check whether other labour market frictions can explain unemployment 
persistence. Therefore, we extend our analysis by using various additional covariates for our 
sample of OECD countries.14 The new covariates are the minimum wage (Mw), unemployment 
insurance and unemployment assistance benefits proxied by the gross replacement rate (Grr), two 
measures of strictness of employment protection for regular contracts (Epr) and temporary 
employment (Ept) and severance pay at three levels of tenure; 9 months (Sev1), 4 years (Sev2) and 
20 years (Sev3). We follow Banker et al. (2013) by employing an unweighted average of Epr and 
                                                          
14 We also implement the analysis using the additional covariates of labour market frictions for the sub-
sample of 17 OECD countries that is used in the robustness section. The results are qualitatively similar 
with those based on the sample of the 21 OECD countries. However, the reader should interpret all these 
results, based on the additional covariates, with caution due to data limitations and the low power of the 
tests in small size. These additional results are available from the authors upon request. 
13 
Ept (and similarly of Sev1, Sev2 and Sev3) to create an aggregate measure of employment 
protection, Epl (and of severance pay, Sev). The source of these additional covariates is the OECD 
and, specifically, the labour force statistics (Mw), the benefits and wages database (Grr) and the 
employment protection database (for all Epl and Sev indicators). 
These covariates could influence unemployment persistence through different mechanisms. 
Unemployment benefits (Grr), for instance, affect the search intensity of unemployed workers and 
thereby discourage labour supply (Hagedorn et al., 2013). In addition, the minimum wage (Mw) 
can create involuntary unemployment by increasing labour cost, see Holmlund (2014). 
Employment protection legislation is a major source of hiring and firing costs thus may discourage 
job creation and increases the persistence of unemployment (Banker et al., 2013 and Holmlund, 
2014). Therefore, we follow the literature, such as Banker et al. (2013), and use indexes of 
employment protection for both regular and temporary employees along with the average of these 
two indicators as an aggregate measure of employment protection legislation (Epl). Additionally, 
we test the effect of severance pay (Sev) which is one of the component of the Epl indicator that 
can affect labour demand as it associated with higher labour cost, see Garibaldi and Violante 
(2005). 
Table 6 displays the results of the covariate CIPSM panel unit root test based on these covariates 
for the sample of 21 OECD countries. The results show that these additional covariates cannot 
explain the persistence of unemployment as we cannot reject the unit root null in almost all cases. 
The only exceptions are in the case of using Grr as the additional covariate where the CIPSM test 
rejects the null hypothesis of unit root but only in the version without trend and the case of using 
Sev1 in the version of the test with trend. Overall, we cannot find sufficient evidence about the role 
14 
of these covariates in explaining hysteresis in OECD countries.15 
– Table 6 here – 
Finally, to check for the robustness of our main findings, we conduct the panel unit root testing 
framework presented in Tables 3 and 4, including now the CSBM test that requires balance data, 
on the sub-sample of 17 OECD countries where data are available for the full period.16 This sample 
consists of the main 21 OECD countries, excluding Greece, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain to 
have a balanced panel. The results from the panel unit root test without covariates for the 17 OECD 
countries, presented in Table 7, show that unemployment rate exhibits a unit root behaviour, 
confirming the findings based on the 21 OECD sample. We then move to apply the CIPSM and 
CSBM covariate panel unit root tests in the balanced data set of the 17 OECD countries. The 
findings from the CIPSM test are consistent with our previous results from Table 4. Particularly, 
the null hypothesis of a unit root in the panel is rejected at conventional levels of statistical 
significance in 13 out of 16 cases, for the individual covariates and the alternative combinations 
of them, see Table 8. The results based on the CSBM test are similar and reveal stronger evidence 
of rejection of the null hypothesis of hysteresis for all sixteen cases of choices of covariates. Thus, 
our results are robust across different samples and tests and demonstrate that unemployment 
exhibits hysteretic behaviour in OECD countries and insiders’ power is a key source of this 
behaviour.  
                                                          
15 Recalling the data limitation for these additional covariates, the reader has to be careful so as to not 
interpret these findings as evidence against the ability of other theories to explain hysteresis. 
16 The CSBM test of Pesaran et al. (2013) is based on the average of the cross-sectionally augmented Sargan-
Bhargava statistics,  𝐶𝑆𝐵𝑀 = 𝑁−1 ∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝐶𝑆𝐵𝜙𝑖(𝑁, 𝑇) , where 𝐶𝑆𝐵𝜙𝑖(𝑁, 𝑇) = 𝑇
−2 ∑𝑇𝑡=1 ?̂?𝑖𝑡
2 /?̂?𝑖
2 , ?̂?𝑖𝑡 =
∑𝑡𝑗=1 ?̂?𝑗 , ?̂?𝑖
2 = ∑𝛵𝜏=1 ε̂𝑖𝑡
2 /[𝑇 − (𝑘 + 1)] and finally ?̂?𝑡 are the residuals from the regression of Equation 
(1). 
15 
– Table 7 here – 
– Table 8 here – 
Overall, our results suggest that the insider-outsider covariates can help to explain the hysteretic 
behaviour of OECD unemployment, and this outcome is robust to alternative samples and testing 
methods, while we cannot find any sufficient evidence about the role of other measures of labour 
market frictions in explaining hysteresis in OECD countries. Our findings shed light on the role of 
the insider-outsider theory as a key source of unemployment persistence, confirming the 
theoretical underpinnings of the works by Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1987) and Lindbeck 
and Snower (1988) and show that various indicators of labour markets rigidities that capture the 
insiders’ power and labour turnover cost can explain the hysteretic behaviour of unemployment in 
OECD countries.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Despite the widespread use of insider-outsider theory to describe the hysteretic behaviour of 
unemployment, little is known empirically about its validity as a cause of this behaviour. Using 
proxies of insiders’ power, this paper investigates empirically the relationship between insider-
outsider theory and unemployment hysteresis. To do so, we employ covariate panel unit root tests 
on a sample of 21 OECD countries over the period 1960-2013. Our initial findings provide 
evidence of hysteretic behaviour of unemployment for our sample. However, we find that the 
insider-outsider theory, proxied by the trade union density, the coordination of wage-setting and 
the level of wage-bargaining, can absorb the persistence of unemployment rate in OECD countries. 
16 
Our findings suggest that policy makers should account for the impact of labour markets rigidities, 
which embed the power of the insiders, when introducing policies that aim at the structural 
characteristics of the economy and, thus, direct the economy to absorb the unemployment shocks. 
The power of the insiders implies higher turnover costs, thereby it adversely affects labour 
demand. Thus, shocks in unemployment tend to last for longer period. Our results illustrate the 
importance of structural reforms in the OECD labour markets towards lower labour market 
rigidities, and especially less power of the insiders, in order to stabilize unemployment in the face 
of shocks. In particular, limiting the role of trade unions, reforming job security regulations, and/or 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Un. Rate 5.816 4.127 0.000 27.306 
Union 39.545 18.806 7.548 83.863 
Coord 3.221 1.383 1.000 5.000 
Wbl 3.085 1.336 1.000 5.000 
Power 0.000 1.433 -2.689 2.848 
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the OECD sample, based on N = 21 and T = 54 (TxN = 1134 Obs).   
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 2: Correlation Coefficients between Covariates 
 
Union Coord Wbl 
Union 1 
  
Coord 0.456 1 
 
Wbl 0.513 0.729 1 
Notes: The numbers refer to the Polyserial or Polychoric 
correlation coefficient depending on the type of the variables. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 3: Panel Unit Root Tests (without Covariates) 
Un. Rate Without Trend  With Trend 
 𝑀𝑊 𝐶𝐻 𝐼𝑃𝑆 𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑆  𝑀𝑊 𝐶𝐻 𝐼𝑃𝑆 𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑆 
 31.689 0.394 -1.472 -1.901  34.802 0.503 -2.107 -2.246 
Notes: **, * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively. The lag order is selected according to p =[ 4(T/100)1/4]. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4: Panel Unit Root Tests (with Covariates) 
  CIPSM 
Covariates  Without Trend  With Trend 
Union  -2.630**  -2.863** 
Coord  -2.227*  -2.584 
Wbl  -2.568**  -2.648* 
Power  -2.686**  -2.743** 
     
Union & Coord  -2.609**  -2.813** 
Union & Wbl  -2.497**  -2.802** 
Coord & Wbl  -2.714**  -2.554 
     
Union & Coord & Wbl  -2.472*  -2.486 
Notes: **, * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% and 10% significance level respectively. The 
critical values for the CIPSM test, in the case of one additional covariate, are -2.32 and -2.21 with an intercept only and -
2.73 and -2.63 with an interept and a linear trend for the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  In addition, the 
critical values for the CIPSM test (with two additional covariate) with an intercept only are -2.43 and -2.31 and with an 
interept and a linear trend are -2.80 and -2.68 for the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  Finally, the critical 
values for the CIPSM test (with three additional covariate) with an intercept only are -2.49 and -2.37 and with an interept 
and a linear trend are -2.81 and -2.69 for the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The lag order is selected 
according to p =[ 4(T/100)1/4]. 











Table 5: Panel Fractional Unit Root Tests (with Covariates) 
  ?̂?𝐸𝐿𝑊 
Un. Rate  1.044 (0.158) 
Covariates   
Union  0.947 (0.158) 
Coord  0.843 (0.158) 
Wbl  0.861 (0.158) 
Power  0.981 (0.158) 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 6: Panel Unit Root Tests (with Additional Covariates) 
  CIPSM 
Covariates  Without Trend   With Trend  
Mw  -1.799  -2.404 
Grr  -2.333**  -2.567 
Epl  -1.938  -2.367 
Epr  -1.576  -2.172 
Ept  -1.961  -2.197 
Sev  -1.232  -1.979 
Sev1  -1.971  -2.720** 
Sev2  -1.103  -2.382 
Sev3  -1.528  -2.142 
Notes: **, * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
The critical values for the CIPSM test, in the case of one additional covariate, are -2.32 and -2.21 with an intercept 
only and -2.73 and -2.63 with an interept and a linear trend for the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
The lag order is selected according to p =[ 4(T/100)1/4]. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
25 
Table 7: Panel Unit Root Tests (without Covariates) - 17 OECD Countries 
Un. Rate Without Trend  With Trend 
 𝑀𝑊 𝐶𝐻 𝐼𝑃𝑆 𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑆  𝑀𝑊 𝐶𝐻 𝐼𝑃𝑆 𝐶𝐼𝑃𝑆 
 28.770 -0.319 -1.612 -2.005  30.349 0.306 -2.133 -2.523 
Notes: **, * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
The lag order is selected according to p =[ 4(T/100)1/4]. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 8: Panel Unit Root Tests (with Covariates) - 17 OECD Countries 
  Without Trend   With Trend  
Covariates  CIPSM CSBM  CIPSM CSBM 
Union  -2.824** 0.143**  -2.927** 0.080** 
Coord  -2.117 0.125**  -2.598 0.098* 
Wbl  -2.561** 0.137**  -2.667* 0.082** 
Power  -2.620** 0.140**  -2.733** 0.087** 
       
Union & Coord  -2.678** 0.144**  -3.020** 0.079** 
Union & Wbl  -2.716** 0.135**  -2.948** 0.073** 
Coord & Wbl  -2.545** 0.121**  -2.555 0.084* 
       
Union & Coord & Wbl  -2.477* 0.153**  -2.778* 0.074* 
Notes: **, * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% and 10% significance level respectively. The 
critical values for the CIPSM test with one additional covariate, are -2.32 and -2.21 with an intercept only and -2.73 and -
2.63 with an interept and a linear trend for the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The critical values with two 
additional covariates with an intercept only are -2.43 and -2.31 and with an interept and a linear trend are -2.80 and -2.68. 
The critical values with three additional covariates with an intercept only are -2.49 and -2.37 and with an interept and a 
linear trend are -2.81 and -2.69. In addition, the critical values for the CSBM test with one additional covariate, are 0.238 
and 0.264 with an intercept only and 0.097 and 0.104 with an interept and a linear trend for the 5% and 10% significance 
levels, respectively. The critical values with two additional covariates with an intercept only are 0.207 and 0.231 and with 
an interept and a linear trend are 0.084 and 0.090. Finally, the critical values with three additional covariates with an 
intercept only are 0.178 and 0.200 and with an interept and a linear trend are 0.072 and 0.078. The lag order is selected 
according to p =[ 4(T/100)1/4]. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 1: Unemployment Rate for the 21 OECD Countries against the OECD Average 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
